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Euthanasia, Benemortasia, and the Dy 19
William E . May

The phenome nal adva nces in biomedical technologies a re responsible for loo king with renewed urgency at the questio n of the care o f
the dying. Because of the va rio us
procedures tha t can now be ta ke n
to prolong life, it is nec essary to as k ,
as Kieran Nolan does in his essay
o n "The Care of the Dy ing ", "whether the medical assistance be ing
provided to some pa tie nts is really

In this article, William M ay distinguishes between th e two ethics
of death to pro vide f resh ans wers t o
the ete rnal question: what constitutes a good or happy death ?
Dr. May is a professor in the department of re ligion and re ligious
education at the Cath olic University of America.
helping to preserve the ir lives o r
whethe r it is simply prolonging the ir
death." 1
The prope r c are o f the dying is
allied with the debate over e utha nasia , and it is imperative to begin a
discussion of this subject by making
~orne remarks about termino logy .
Some writers, among them the redoubtable Jose ph Fletche r, distinguish between two kinds o f euthanasia, positive and negative, o r
direct and indirect. The first con-
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sists of direct actions, o r a c of
commission , designe d to te rn •ate
the life o f an individual fo r hu :me
reasons. The second does n< in·
vo lve any di.rect ac ts that ' ,uJd
bring the individual's life to a • l! nd
but rather consists in omittit ac·
tio ns o r discontinuing proce JTes
that maintain or might mainta the
individual in e xistence ..
Many other write rs, among 1em
Pa ul Ra msey and Arthu r Dye and
most Roman C atholic mora list vig·
o ro usly reject this two fold d i -;ion
of e utha nasia. T hey do so be tUSe
they believe (a nd o ne of the , ajor
purpose s of this paper is to how
why the ir be lief is soundly l tsed)
tha t lumping into the one g._ 11eral
c ategory of euthanasia both acts
that directly terminate life and acts
that are not, of the mselves, directly
destruc tive of life is to c onfuse
matters horribly and to be!! the
questio n in discussing intelligently
the issues raise d in the proper care
of the dying. Ramsey, for instance,
argues that the term euthanasia has
ac quired a me aning now similar t~
the meaning of "mercy killing:· Bec ause o f this identificatio n of eu·
thanasia in common speech with
me rcy killing he pro poses to use the
te rm agathanasia to indicate a hap·
py or good death . and to use this
te rm to describe activities that

Linacre Qua rt erly

Fletcher and others would call "negative e uthanasia." 2 ·
In similar fashion Dyc k points
out that the term euthanasia o riginally meant a painless or h appy death,
without any re fe re nce to whethe r
such death was induced . Although
this definition still appe a rs in modem dictionaries, ·t he meaning of
this term that has become prevalent
in our culture is that it is "an act or
method of causing death painlessly
so as to end suffering."3 A ccordingly he proposes a new term , benemortasia, to designate a · happy o r
good death. Dispute can the n ta ke
place over what constitutes a good
or happy death.4
With these remarks a bout te rm in·
ology in mind, we can now seek to
isolate the basic issue a t sta ke be·
tween those who advoca te e u thanasia, whether this be di rect or indi·
rect, positive or negative, and those
wbo vigorously oppose positive e uthanasia yet defe nd a po lic y o f be ne·
mortasia or agatha nasia. The basic
~ue lies in the validity of the dis~mction between active ly terminatmg a huma n life o r causing death
and allowing or pe rmitting a person
to die.
On the one ha nd , one group of
moralists (Fletche r, fo r ins ta nce)
and lawyers (G Ja n ville Williams,
f~r example) ma inta in that the dist~ction is meaningless a t best and
diShonest at wors t , for in the end
everything turns out the same : a
~uman being dies. Since the result
~ the same Williams feels justified
•n writing: "There is no logical o r
Dloral c hasm between what may be
c.alled shortening life a nd accele ratmg death . Once admit the principle
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that a ph~ ·..m may knowingly, fo
sufficient
.;on , shorten a patien t'~
expecta ti
f life - whic h cannot
be denie c
and one is compelled
to a dm it
he may knowingly, fo r
suffic ient "lson, put an e nd to his
patie nt's lt'L im mediately" .s

... .
.

T he Ethics of Euthanasia
Be fore comme nting on Willia m's
opi n ion a nd the validity of the distinc t ion betwee n ca using de ath and
allowi ng a person to die , it is instructi ve to look somewhat mo re closely
a t what can rightly be called the
ethic s of e ut ha nasia. By do ing this
we w ill be able to see more clearly
why many write rs a dvocate voluntary e utha nas ia (no one , at least not
ye t , seems to be calling fo r ma ndatory or o bligatory e uthanas ia) , the
reaso ns they ad vance in its s upport ,
and the presuppositions o r belie fs
tha t unde rgird their position .
The justification of volunta ry e uthanasia has been vigorously a rgued
by J oseph Fletcher, who speaks o f
the " right of spiritual be ings to use
inte lligent control ove r physical na·
lure rathe r tha n to submit beastlike
to its blind workings:·s He continues :
" Death contro l, like birth c o ntro l,
is a matte r of human dignity. With·
o ut it pe rsons become puppe ts . To
perceive this is to grasp the e rro r
lurking in the notion - widespread
in medical c ircles - that life as s uc h
is the highest good."7 It is instructi ve to note that Fletc he r locates
oppositio n to the direct killing o f
huma n be ings for compass io nate
reason in the be lie f that "life as suc h
is the highest good." It is also instruc tive to note that some of the
elements leading Fletcher to his ad-
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c ian chooses to have life short d
voca\ of voluntary e utha n tsia a hi1 priority assigned to man's by failing to accept'or use life ·arat it ol control of his life , a some- lo nging techniques and thos mwha l pejorative evaluation of man's stances in which a patient o r 1 sibio logical processes, a nd locating cian shortens life by e mploy1 a
opposition to the direct killing of death-dealing c hemical or i1 ruhuman beings in a belief in the ab- ment."10 They maintain · that t thsolute inviolability o f life , in re- ing o f c ruc ial moral significa n is
a t stake in distinguishing bet en
garding it as a summum bo num are reflected in an influential and directly killing someone and dieir
very perceptive essay by Danie l C. rec tly permitting him to die .
reason
fo
r
discounting
th
i~
lisMaguire , a Catholic moralist of untinctio
n,
it
seems,
is
that
the
.ult
8
usual ability. Although some individuals may o ppose eutha nasia be- o r conseque nce of the acts inn :ed
cause they believe that human life is the same: a human being di At
itself is the highest good, it is a n the risk of oversimplification . ugoversimpl ification to maintain that gest that the e thics of eutha n. .1 is
inthis is the major reason why think- what can be called an ethics
nt;
it
is
an
ethics
in
which
th
11ate
ing men oppose the ethic o f e uthanasia. One need not, indeed ought jo r determinant (in some v. ters
not , maintain that life is the highest e .g. Fletche r, the sole determ 1nt )
of
good in order to oppose direct eu- o f the rightness o r wro ngm
what
one
does
is
the
good
<
evil
thanasia. One need o nly mainta in
tha t life is a real human good , a that is both inte nded by the (e nt
good just as basic and just as human and results from the action tl t he
as intelligence or rational contro l, undertakes.
in o rder to argue that its deliberate
In his pe·r ceptive article Jyck
a nd direct destruction inevitably lists fo ur presuppositions th · he
means that o ne is turning against a believes are operative in this thics
basic human good and making it o f e uthanasia. These can bL -;umsomething e vil, some thing to be marize d in my pa rapht'ase of r vc k's
~xterminated , here and now.
work as fo llows:
The arguments for euthanasia,
1. An individua l human bo:ing's
as Dyc k notes, "focus o n two hulife belo ngs to him to d t'ipose
m a ne and s ig nifica nt co nce rns:
o f entire ly as he o r she v. ishes. ·
"compassion for those who are painfully and te rminally ill ; concern fo r
2. The dignity of pe rsonhtlod is
the human dignity associated with
rooted in personal free dom, a
freedom of c ho ice. Compassion and
freedom that demands the freefreedom are values that sustain and
dom to take one's own life.
enhance the common good.''9 To
3. There is such a thing as a life
these positive considerations is linknot worth living , whether by
ed the denial that there is any legitireason of distress, illness. pain.
ma te m oral distinc tion " between
whatever.
or
th<;>se where a patie nt o r a physi-
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4. The only absolute o r supreme
value is "human dignity," which
consists in the huma n being's
capacity to choose and control
life and death .n

The Ethics of Benemortasia
Those who, like me, oppose an
ethics of euthanasia and advocate
an ethics of agathanasia o r benemortasia share the concern of the
advocates of euthanasia for the
values of compassion a nd human
freedom. They reject the view, set
forth by some doctors, that the medical professio n and society has a
moral obligation to p\usue relentlessly and aggressively every possible means of maintaining life until
the matter is finally beyond every
human control. They reject, in other
words, the "save and care" .e thics
!lS this is understood, fo r e xample ,
by such writers as Gerald Leach.12
They reject this view because it, like
the view of the advocates o f euthanasia, regards the distinction between
directly causing death and allowing
~ person to die as mo ra lly insignificant , a "moral quibble." l3
Those who advocate an ethics of
benemortasia argue tha t the distinction cited previously is valid and
~hat far more than a "mo ral quibble"
JS at stake. What is at stake is the
meaning of human existence as a
moral existence. Not o nly are comPassion and freedom huma n values
h
.
•
ow we ach1eve these values is
equally important, for it tells us
SOmething about our worth as monll
beings. In other words , an ethics of
benemortasia is as concerned with
means as it with ends; it is not simply
an ethic of intent but an ethics of
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intent
ontent. By this I mean
that it
s not regard the gond
consequ
es intended by an agent
a suffic i
justifier of his d eeds; the
meani nL significance o f the deeds
where h' bt: ac hieves his good pur·poses i~ a lso a determinant of their
moralin. For a n ethics of benemortasia a hu man deed not only gets
somethmg done, that is, has conseque nces o r results, but it also gets
some thing said, that is , it has somethi ng to tell us about the meaning
of our lives.l4 An ethics of benemortasia, consequently , recognizes
that human freedom is no t an absolute but has certain constra ints, constraints that e nable human beings
to be humanly compassio nate and
humanly free.
One of the constraints limiting
human freedom and enabling human be ings to exercise compassion
and freedom humanly is the constraint o bjectified and articulated
in the commandment "Thou shalt
not kill :' What this constraint means
has been well express by Professor
Dyck. "The injunctio n not to kill ,"
he writes,
is part o f a total e ffort to prevent the
destruction of the human commun ity. It
is a n absolute prohibition in the sense
that no society can be indiffe rent about
the tak ing of human life. Any act , insofar
as it an act of taking a human life (and
this is why e uthanasia, as an activity di·
rectly terminating life, is) is wrong: tha t
is to say , that taking a human life is a
wrong-making c haracteristic of actions.
To say, however. that killing is a prima
facie wrong does not mean that a n act of
killing may never be justified. For example, a person's efforts to prevent someone's death may lead to the dea th of the
allac ker. However, we can morally justify
that act of interve ntion o nly because it's
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act

f saving a life, not becau.,
tking a life}5

11 is an

Pe rh< we could put it th b way.
O ne I ma n being oug ht not d trectfy
take human life, e ither his o v. n o r
another's, because no huma n be ing
exists apart fro m othe r hu man beings. And no t o nly is human existence a coexiste nce, not only is
being huma n a being with, it is also
a being/or. We human beings exist
with and for o ne ano the r; each o f
us holds his life at the me rcy o f h is
fe llo wme n. I think tha t some th ing
of profo und Christian m eaning is at
q uestio n he re. As C hr istia ns we believe that huma n beings a re the
images o f Go d , his living iko ns as it
were. And just as the living God. the
o nly God, is an Emma nue l, a God
who, as Karl Ba rth has no ted, exis ts
" ne ither next to m an nor abo1•e him.
but with him , by him, and a bove a ll
for him ," 16 so we. his iko ns o r
c reated words, ex ist with a nd fo r
o ne ano th er .
But wha t abo ut ·the distinc tio n
between ta king a life, causing death
directly. a nd pe rmitting a pe rson
to d ie? Is th is a valid ethica l d istinc ti o n? Re flectio n o n th e hum an
sig nifica nce o r meaning o f o ur
deeds. I believe. solidly suppo rts
th is dis tinctio n. Obvio usly som e
kind of huma n choice a nd huma n
acti o n is involved in bo th types of
acti vity. but th e re is a vas t mora l
differe nce, a genuine chasm in th e
way the actio n is re lated to the ide ntity of th e agents respo nsible - the
way the deed sha pes o r fo rms the
mo ral be ing of the agent. As Dr. J .
Russell Elkinto n has no ted with
respect to allowing a patient to die,
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"it is mo ra lly dec isive tha t the
tie nt dies no t fro m the act b ut fr• 1
the unde rlying d isease or inju ry
T o put it d iffe re ntly we can c ite e
wo rds of Dr. C .B. Giertz. "No ~ p
is ta ken with the object of kill g
the patie nt. We refra in f.ro m _tro tme nt because it does not serve y
purpose . . . I canno t _regard th i ts
killing by medical means: death ts
already wo n, despite the figh t e
have put up."18
M o re p ositive ly, we can say, ' !h
Ramsey, 19 that the decisio n no • to
ad minister certain life-s usta ll tg
tec hnologies o r to cease e mplo' tg
the m is a decis io n to care for te
dy ing pe rso n, to minister to his n ds
as a huma n be ing in the proce· of
dying and to ma ke his act of d ng
an ac t whe re huma n presence nd
human concern a re of g reater ' uc
tha n tubes inserted into noses. ·ctums, oth e r o penings of va r >us
sorts and so fo rth .

Ordinary and Extraordinary
A Distinction
Traditionally medical eth i c~ has
distinguis hed between ordinar_1 a nd
extraordinary m eans of pre se t ving
life: the first have been rega tied
as m a nda to ry o r obligatory. w h reas
the latte r have been regardc l as
elective. This d istinc tio n bet'' een
ordina ry and e xtraordinary mt:ans
is c ruc ia l to unde rsta ndi ng the differe nce in me ntality between an
ethics of e uthanasia and an et hics
of be ne mo rtasia. T he e th ics of benemo rtasia, a s noted alread y. shares
the co nc ern for compassion and
freedo m r e flected in a n ethics of
euthanasia, but this · co ncern is fo-
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cussed o n the care given to the dying person . Ra msey ex presses this
very eloquently:
The dif ference bet ween only c aring fo r
the dying and acts of euthanasia is not a
cho ice between indirectly and directly
wi lling and doing something. It is rather
the important choice bet ween doing something and doing nothing, o r (better said)
ceasing to do something that was begu n
in o rder to do something that is better
because m ore fitt ing. In omission no hu. man agent causes the patient's death ,
directly or indirectly. H e · dies his own
death from causes that it is no longer merciful or reasonable to fig ht by means of
possible medical interventions. I ndeed,
it is not q uite right to say that we o nly
. care for the dying by an o mission, by " d oing nothing" directly o r indirectly. Instead , we cease d oing what was o nce
called for and begin to do precisely what
is called for now. We attend and company with him in th is, his very own dy ing.
rendering it as comfo rtable and as dignified as possible.20

Altho ugh giving a patien t a fa ta l
dose of medicine and turni ng off a
respirato r are both deliberate acts
and result in the same end - the
death of the pa tie nt - there is a s ignificant differe nce between them as
means or human acts (with Ge rm a in
Grisez21 I ma inta in tha t in the mo ral
order a me ans to an e nd is eithe r
one human act o r series of acts and
not a partial as pect of a n act). Administering a fa tal d rug is to ta ke
life from the patie nt ; stopping procedures that have no reasonable
hope of success in e nabling the patient to carry o n h is vita l func tions
With some degree of spontaneity
and simply pro vide a mechanical
way of susta ining life processes is
to allow the patient to comple te his
own dying and m o re positively to
permit his family a nd frie nds to ta ke
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appro pr
ca ring actions to fu lfill
the ir OP
Lion to care fo r the I' 1tie nt a!>
uman pe rson .
The l
nc tion between o rdina ry
a nd ext', tl inary means, o r mandatory a n~ :kct ive procedures. must
no t (a!> n <my moralists and Pius X II
have ll lltt:d freque ntly) be misunders tood. The d istinction is ~ot. as
M aguire says.22 "faci le," no r is it
some g immick to save consciences.
It is a diffic ult dist inc tion to ma ke,
but il is o ne that good medicine can
and must ma ke. The terms "ord inary" an d "extrao rdina ry" are to be
taken in their mo ra l sense, and this
need no t coincide with their medical
meaning in a technological sense. A
procedure that may be o rdinary in
the medically technological sense
(e.g., int rave nous feedi ng, the use
of a heart pacemaker, etc.) because
they are commonly used may be extraordinary in the m o ral sense. The
te rms have a great deal of relativity,
not because of any kind of moral
re lativism, but because they a re
re lative to the condition of the patient, to th e morally significant
r ea lit y- ma kin g facto rs that give
the m their mo ral meaning. An intraveno us feeding that is indeed
o rdinary a nd mandatory fo r a pa~
t ie nt of a certa in age, with a partic ular kind of d isease or inj ury a nd
reasonable hope of recovery might
be extraordina ry - indeed might
const itute a senseless and brutal
pro lo ngatio n of an individua l's o wn
dying processes - for a ninety-fiveyea r-old person in a coma, sufferi ng
in additio n fro m bone cancer a nd
pne umo nia. Amo ng the factors th at
a re reality-making in determ ining
the conditio n of the patient are h is
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own ft ·dom to die the dea l 1 that
he is i ·act dying and the fact that
he ha' !ready begun the process of
dyi ng Although it is no eas) tas k
to determine what, in fact, the condition of the patient is - and this
means that the distinc tion between
o rdinary and extraordinary is surely
not "facile" - this is a task at the
heart of the care that physicians a nd
medical science can and must extend to fellow human beings.
Human Deeds
An ethics o f benemortasia or
agathanasia opposes an ethics of
e uthanasia not only o n the grou nds
that human freedom is limited in its
exercise by constra ints rooted in
justice (and in Christian love), no t
only on the grounds that the distinction between directly killing a
human being and a llowing him to
die is valid and not some kind of
facile gimmic k , but also on the
gro unds that a human being makes
his moral being o r achieves his
moral identity in a nd through his
deeds. Because of this an ethics of
benemortasia insists on a truthful
a nalysis and descriptio n of human
deeds and argues that any action
rightly described as a n act o f direct
killing is o ne that human beings
o ught not to do, because it means
tha t human being has taken on, as
pa rt of his moral identity. the identity of a killer, of a pe rson who repudiates the goodness and worth of
human existence.
But when is a human deed properly and truthfully describable as
a n act of killing, as an act whereby
the doer inevitably incorporates into
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his moral being - whether he w· ts
to or not - the identity of a k il ·?
After reflecting seriously on im t rtant articles bearing on this t• 1c
by Ramsey,23 Grisez,24 J. G t m
Gray,25 and Tho mas Aquinas26 · m
whom, inc ide nta lly, bOth G r ~z
and Ramsey depend in many w; .; ),
I think that it can be said that a ·rson accepts the ide ntity of a k e r
if he intends the death of ano e r
human being and he cannot ot
intend that death if his act is i ; If
directed against the life of tha t ·rson so that his death is the p r. er
" ta rget" or "end" o f the act itsell
Assume now that one com e ~ )n
the scene of a n a utomobile w• c k
and discovers a pe rson trapped 1 a
flaming car a nd being slowly ro a ed
to death and finds it impossiblt e rther to release him or to exting tsh
the flames? W o uld one be takin: o n
the ide ntity o f :. killer if, in a ca~ · of
this kind, he we re to shoot the ,e rson being roasted to death? ( h is
case would fall under the sec md
" qualification;, suggested by Ra msey
in his important study on our o bitgation to care fo r the dying.27 ) C t~ uld
I shoot someone in a situation of
this kind, foresee ing that he is go ing
to die as a result o f my act, and still
claim truthfully tha t I am not k ill ing
him and killing him directly? I believe that certain disce.rnible features or reality-making facJors ma ke
it possible for one to say that he is
not. in this type of case, engaged in
an act of killing and is not directly
intending death in and through his
act. A comparison of this kind of
case with the defense of another human being fro m an assailant bent
on killing him is helpful to show why
j
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I have come to thi.s be lief. One who
rescues a fellow human being from
an assailant of this kind may , of
,course, be engaged in a n act of
killing - but he may also be engaged
in an act of justifiable defense. If he
does intend the death of the assailant, his act is an act of killing; the
assailant's death is itself the means
to his end of rescuing the other person, and his action is ta rgeted upon
his life. His action, in o the r wo rds, is
an act of killing; its thrust or d irection is aga inst the life of the assailant ; this is the finis operis a nd is inescapably an element in the finis
operantis. However he may not intend the death o f the assailant
(while clearly foreseeing that th e
assailant will die) , and his action,
although it results in the assailant's
death , is targeted no t upo n his life
but upon the force that the assailant is bringing against his victim.28
In similar fashion, it can , I believe,
be argue d , in the case o f the person
being slowly roasted to death in an
automobile wreck, the action is not
directed against the ltfe o f the person but upon the agonizing pain the
person experiences in being roasted
to death - somewhat in the way
that an aspirin is directed against
the pain of a headache.
The analysis offe red here is of a
very rare type of case - a case that
is not any "exceptio n" to o ur obligation to love life and to share life
With our fellow me n , but is rather a
case in which facto rs intrins ic to the
action as a network of relations between human beings inhe re ntl y
change the species of the ac tion. 29
The analysis, I be lieve, is truthful.
Admittedly it may never occur in
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medical ,
Ramsey
class -w
could O L

,·tice (the "qua lificatio n"
Joses may , he says, be a
'lit members), but it
in life.
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Conclusion

", i.

In C < ncluding this paper, I think
it worthwhile to note the presu ppositions of an ethics of benemortasia or aga thanasia , inasmuch as the
presuppositions of a n ethics of euthan asia have a lready been noted .
According to Professor Dyck an
ethics of benemortasia , a n ethics
concerned with means as well as
ends. with the content or significance of our .activit ies as well as
with their intended results, are the
following (again, I a m paraphrasing
slightly Dyck's formula tion):
1

,

3. Every life has some worth.
4. The supereme value is goodness itself to which the dying
and those who care for the dying are responsible.30
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2. The dignity of the person by
reason of his freedom of cho ice·
includes the freedom dying
persons have to refuse noncurative, life-prolongi ng interventions, but does not exte nd
to taking one's life or causing
dea th.

I

• ''
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·: . ·i....

4

L An individual human being's
life is not solely a t the disposal
of that person; every human
life is part of a human community that is he ld together in
p a rt by a respect for life and by
a love of the lives of its me mbers.
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